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"Opening the Barbarians' Gate" or Watching the
Barbarians from the Coliseum: A Requiem on the
Nomos of the Louisiana Civil Law
Marc L. Roark*
By the advice of their protectors (the Romans), they (the
Britons) now built a wall across the island from one sea to
the other, which being manned with a proper force, might
be a terror to the foes whom it was intended to repel, and a
protection to their friends whom it covered. But this wall,
being made of turf instead of stone, was of no use to that
foolish people, who had no head to guide them. 1
In their original form, they were watched by very few
spectators who had to squeeze in against each other,
pushing and jostling, straining and craning their necks to
get a look at the bloody action being played out before
them. These rough congregations, in which the spectators
quickly planted themselves wherever they could find a
place with a decent view, contained the seeds of the great
spectacles of later years. They were primitive showcases
for fighting and nothing more, and were certainly not
prepared or stage managed in the manner that would later
become commonplace . . . . It was not long, however,
before seats were added and hired out to spectators who
were thus afforded a little more comfort as they watched
each pair of gladiators fight .... 2
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Comparative law tends to focus on the differences and
similarities present in different legal systems. Such analysis has
led some to conclude that a third legal system has appeared in the
West and in particular in Louisiana. The idea of a mixed
jurisdiction, they claim, combines certain elements of civil law and
common law into a hybrid system. This article challenges the
supposition that a legal system's core identity can be of a mixed
nature. Rather, this article suggests that the proper way a legal
system should be viewed is through its normative values as
depicted in the narratives the system spawns-a nomos that directs
the purveyors of the system towards the sources and identity that
the system enchants. Focusing primarily on Louisiana, Part I of
this article describes three normative elements that narratives tell
about the Louisiana civil law: its Frenchness, its distinctiveness,
and its dependency on a code. Part II then tells two narratives that
demonstrate how these normative elements are revealed, even
when they are not completely accurate. Part III challenges the
readers to inhabit the nomos.
I. INSTITUTIONAL IDENTITY VERSUS NoMos
There is a story in human history that the barbarians sitting on
the verge of civilized society shaped human innovation.3 That, as
uncivilized "tribes" threatened the parameters of the modem
world, society had no choice but to innovate and repel the
advances of chaos or themselves be infused with the chaos that the
barbarians brought. The Mongols, the Huns, the Gauls, the Celts,
the Turks, and the Germans each were the driving force requiring
societies on the other side to develop or disorganize.
There is a similar story told in legal communities in two
variations. In law (at least in the Western legal tradition) one is
trained primarily as a civilian or as a common lawyer. The
narrative is therefore told as either one of passive virtues (we stand
at the gate and allow the other to influence our own legal tradition)
or one of aggressive resistance (we stand aloof and reject the other
as antiquated or barbaric given our predisposition). To be sure
3. See generally William McNeil, PURSUIT OF POWER: TECHNOLOGY,
ARMED FORCE, AND SOCIETY SINCE AD 1000 (1982).
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there is no natural affinity between the two. But it is undeniable
that systems do from time to time borrow from one another,
despite the perception that each remains superior to its
counterpart.4 Such is the premise behind comparative law.5 The
more politically friendly version tends to suggest a developing
third family of legal tradition known for the combination of
civilian and common law themes-that jurisdictions are becoming
multi-traditional, mixed, or "bijural. ' 6
4. See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, John Henry Merryman and Comparative
Legal Studies: A Dialogue, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 3, 58 (1999) (Pierre Legrand, in a
dialogue with John Henry Merryman, explains the preference one has for either
civil law or common law theory); Paul G. Mahoney, The Common Law and
Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 506-07
(2001) (arguing that the common law is more predictable than the civil law
system because of its respect for precedents and the power of its appellate
courts).
5. "[T]here doesn't exist in the modem world a pure judicial system
formed without exterior influence." Vernon Valentine Palmer, LOUISIANA:
MICROCOSM OF A MIXED JURISDICTION 4 n.6 (1999) (quoting Pierre Arminjon,
Baron Boris Nolde & Martin Wolff, 1 TRAITt DE DROIT COMPARE 49 (1950)).
The observation that one system of law derives essentially from the institutions
that can be attributed to it (or in Palmer's case a combination of certain
institutions) ignores the truism that comparative law cannot be simply reduced
to an evaluation of similarities and differences: such analysis ignores relevant
social, political, moral, and economic values that more proximately determine
the legal course of a jurisdiction. See Alan Watson, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 4
(1974). In that sense, Merryman's conclusion that legal "traditions" are more
appropriately considered over "legal systems" reflects the well thought out
conclusion that law tends to reflect "deeply rooted, historically conditioned
attitudes about the nature of law, about the role of law in the society," about the
institutions of the law, and about how law is to come about. See John Henry
Merryman, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 2 (1969).
6. Vernon Palmer has written the most in this area. See, e.g., Palmer,
supra note 5 (collecting essays from various fields to illustrate the tension that
exists in a "mixed jurisdiction"); Vernon Valentine Palmer, THE LOUISIANA
CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE: CRITIQUES OF CODIFICATION IN A MIXED JURISDICTION
(2005) (collection of essays by Palmer relating to Louisiana's dual nature
through time and various code reforms); Vernon Valentine Palmer, MIXED
JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE: THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY (2001) (hereinafter
Palmer, WORLDWIDE) (Palmer's magnum opus on mixed jurisdictions). Palmer
is not alone. In 2003, the Tulane Law Review collected numerous articles on
this topic, including one by Palmer. See generally Vernon Valentine Palmer,
Salience and Unity in Mixed Jurisdictions: The Papers of the World Congress,
78 TUL. L. REV. 1 (2003).
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The danger in creating a "new legal tradition" from the relics
of traditions is that it tends to devalue the traditions that
supposedly have been combined. So, when Palmer writes that
"because of their double genetic makeup mixed jurisdictions must
appear anomalous (and unclassified) when compared to one of
their two parents,"7 he tells us that the two traditions cease to exist
in the shadow of the third. Said another way, the "new legal
system" becomes an orphan, unsure whether its institutions and
enabling devices derive from one system or another. Thus in the
same way that comparative law runs the risk of exaggerating the
origins of differences, 8 creating a new legal family where there
really is none risks isolating legal systems to the point of losing
tradition. To be sure, Louisiana has never thought of itself as alone
in the sense that Palmer would suggest that it is; it has also never
thought of itself as being aligned with the various other "mixed
jurisdictions" that are opposed to being aligned by civilian values.9
Instead, like other legal systems that share legal traits between
multiple systems, Louisiana has continued to consider itself
characterized by a dominant persuasion-Louisiana is a civilian
jurisdiction. This is not surprising; legal systems continue to retain
a dominant legal tradition that is unmitigated, though phenomena
appear that do not derive from the dominant tradition. Said
slightly differently, there is a nomos to legal traditions in much the
same way that there is a nomos to specific legal cultures-an aura
that transcends the institutions that make up the tradition. That
7. Palmer, supra note 5, at 7.
8. See Watson, supra note 5, at 4. Comparative law cannot be primarily a
matter of drawing comparisons. Those who would disagree with this
proposition proceed from one of two starting points. They may start from an
individual legal problem they consider to be the same in more than one
jurisdiction and examine the legal response to it. As one scholar has put it, "The
fact that the problem is one and the same warrants the comparability." Id. Or
they may take a branch of law, say contract, and investigate in detail the
differences and similarities of the individual rules. But it is doubtful if the
comparisons are justifiable in academic terms as comparative law, whether the
starting point is the legal problem or the branch of law. Variations in the
political, moral, social, and economic values that exist between any two
societies make it hard to believe that many legal problems are the same for both,
except on a technical level.
9. Palmer's family of "mixed jurisdictions" includes South Africa,
Scotland, Louisiana, Quebec, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Israel. See
generally Palmer, WORLDWIDE, supra note 6.
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nomos includes the stories we tell about ourselves-the ways we
perceive our institutions interacting with others-and the
insulation of our traditions from those we deem contrary or
destructive to our own.
It also includes hints that recognize the corpus of the dominant
tradition as being superior to the secondary tradition; 10 simply put,
we prefer the legal institutions with which we grow familiar. I
remember my first year torts professor reminding us civilian
students that the barbarians in our class (the common law students)
were indeed engaging in barbarism of the common law-fighting
one another in courts to determine what the law was. We needed
no contest of strength to know the law; we had the law and it was
held in a central Civil Code-as sacred as the Bible and as wise as
the ancients. Even now, as a scholar that engages more common
lawyers than I do civilians, my mind oftentimes wonders and
visualizes the superior legal training I received versus the vile
combat these poor fellows must engage in on a regular basis. It is
10. See Legrand, supra note 4, at 58-59. Legrand ("PL") and Merryman
("JHM") had the following conversation:
PL: As you yourself observe, there is, despite the deficits you identify,
a feeling among many civilians that the civil law tradition is "superior"
to the common law. Why this sentiment? Would it suggest that there
is less receptivity toward alterity in the civil law than in the common
law?
JHM: I came to this conclusion by reading the work of civil law
lawyers. There are passages making it very clear that they find a
sophistication in the civil law that they do not see anywhere else. They
regard the common law as relatively crude and undeveloped. If you
accept their idea of what constitutes superiority--the emphasis on hard-
edged concepts, system, abstraction, and all that-I see what they are
saying.
PL: Have you encountered the same feeling of superiority in your
common law colleagues vis-A-vis the civil law?
JHM: Of course, at least among American lawyers. But the values on
which they hang their idea of superiority are completely different: there
is the belief that the common law is more functional, more efficient,
and so on. Having said this, I think that the feeling of superiority is
stronger in the civil law. One of the things that bothers a lot of civil
law lawyers about the common law is that they can not find it. They do
not know where it is.
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the vision of the noble savages battling for the law, as the civilized
world sits smugly, watching their efforts, while holding the canon
in its hands--the precious Civil Code.
But even by my description of the smugness that derives from
certain preference judgments within the civilian and common law
traditions, the nomos begins to be revealed. Some have suggested
that the civil law suffers from a superiority belief." In Louisiana,
in recent years, that belief has come under siege. The perception
that the Louisiana civil law has much to learn from its common
law neighbors, at least within certain legal fields, seems to be
growing in popularity. But much of this discussion has also
become diluted. Instead of focusing on systems, the analysis has
turned towards institutions within systems. We do not say the civil
law system is superior. Rather, we now talk in terms of the
superiority of civil law property systems, the sales code, or family
law. 12 Let me give two examples from the recent past.
At the 2002 Tucker Lecture, my friend Kathy Lorio asked the
question, "Is what remains in Louisiana of the civil law tradition,
archaic or prophetic?"' 3 It seems that during the drastic changes to
the Louisiana law of successions in the 1990s,14 the Reporter for
11. Id. See also Merryman, supra note 5, at 3.
12. Historic reasons could account for this distinction. Joseph Dainow
noted the following:
The Civil Law in Louisiana is not the whole legal system but only
those parts contained in the Civil Code, namely the law of persons and
the family, property, successions and donations, obligations and the
various private contracts (most important of which are sale and lease),
the security devices of pledge and suretyship as well as privileges and
mortgages, plus the acquisitive and liberative prescriptions. In a civil
law country, the so-called civilian method of thinking and the civilian
techniques are considered as characterizing also the nature and
development and interpretation of other areas of that country's legal
system ....
Joseph Dainow, The Planiol Treatise on the Civil Law: French and Louisiana
Law for Comparative Study, 10 AM. J. COMP. L. 175, 176(1961).
13. Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Louisiana Civil Law Tradition: Archaic
or Prophetic in the Twenty-First Century, 63 LA. L. REv. 1, 3 (2003).
14. I call the move drastic, not as a negative connotation, but because of its
breadth and scope. The changes to the laws of successions and donations in the
1990s were certainly dramatic, as seen by the amount of law review crescendo
that the changes wrought. See, e.g., Katherine Connell-Thouez, The New
Forced Heirship in Louisiana: Historical Perspectives, Comparative Law
Analyses and Reflections upon the Integration of New Structures into a
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the Louisiana State Law Institute ("Law Institute") developed the
obnoxious habit of referring to certain institutions as "archaic,"
ultimately memorializing that commentary in the official
comments to the Code. 5 Comments such as these annoyed the
persons who saw the civil law not as archaic, but as a timeless
system that defined persons, their property, and their transactions.
Lorio was one of those persons and wrote passionately about civil
law institutions that could be deemed as more contemporary than
ancient. During that same event, Professor Patrick Martin of
Louisiana State University stood up and addressed the audience
and proudly proclaimed in effect, "I believe that the rest of the
nation could learn from the Louisiana civil law approach to
property."
Lorio's approach (and Professor Martin's on a larger scale)
focused on the institutions of the civil law to show that they have a
place in the dialogue of law. Their comments were to this effect:
"The civil law is superior because X manifestation is better than
the common law Y." This rubric seems misplaced to me, though I
sympathize with their reactions. Exchanging the corpus of the
tradition for the institutional preference compromises the essence
of the civilian tradition itself. It says, in effect, that the institutions
of the civilian tradition-instead of its inherent characteristics (the
Classical Civil Law System, 43 LoY. L. REV. 1 (1997); Cynthia Ann Samuel, The
1997 Successions and Donations Revision: A Critique in Honor of A.N
Yiannapoulos, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1041 (1999); Ronald J. Scalise, The Chaos and
Confusion of Modern Collation: A Critical Look into an Institution of Louisiana
Succession Law, 75 TUL. L. REV. 411 (2000); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Forced
Heirship Changes: The Regrettable "Revolution" Completed, 57 LA. L. REV. 55
(1996); Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Aftermath of the "Revolution, " 51 LA. L.
REV. 469 (1991); Katherine Shaw Spaht, The New Forced Heirship Legislation:
A Regrettable "Revolution," 50 LA. L. REV. 409 (1990). See also Kathryn
Venturatos Lorio, The Changing Face of Forced Heirship: A New Louisiana
Creation, in Palmer, supra note 5, at 181.
15. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 941 cmt. (a), 951 cmt., 1616 cmt. (2006).
The summary of archaic provisions is. provided by Max Nathan in his
Introduction to the New Louisiana Law of Successions, in THE CIVIL CODE
(2003). Additionally, the introduction to the law of partnership article
summarizes the retention of provisions deemed archaic at various times and
circumstances. See I LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE Bk. III, tit. XI, Introduction (A.N.
Yiannopoulos ed., 2006).
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nomos)--define the tradition. Lorio (and others) are asking what it
means to be a civilian jurisdiction in tension with its common law
surroundings. One answer to that question is that being civilian
means looking civilian. That is, we know we are a civilian
jurisdiction because we have institutions like forced heirship and
community property, among other things, that can be derived from
our civilian heritage; our imagination has become confined to a
rubric that says "we are what we look like."
Taken as a simple statement, "we are what we look like" is a
truism, correct and timeless. It forms the basis of what this article
is about-we really are what we look like, or rather, we are what
we imagine that we look like. I want to suggest that being civilian
is less about institutional appearance and more about the nomos of
the civil law. That is, the civil law is not definable by institutions,
as institutions are temporary place-holders within the tradition.
Rather, like so many other things, the Louisiana civil law is
defined usually by the perceptions we draw regarding what we
"should look like." Mere institutional appearance, on the other
hand, does not tell us what to do with legal innovations that have
no root in either the civil or common law traditions. For this
reason, an institutional appearance cannot be the basis for locating
a tradition, though it can be an identifier.
Let me state this using the forced heirship example. One could
argue from the forced heirship debate that the civilian tradition was
well thought out, was designed to protect family, and was a built-in
mechanism to limit dependency on the state for maintenance of
individuals. Accordingly, its deep-rooted tradition in the Louisiana
and French Civil Codes is justified by the policy reasons that
support its continuance. One could also plausibly argue today that
the transmogrification of forced heirship from a guarantee of
family legacies to a protection for minor children and incapacitated
adults is now the commodity of the civilian tradition on forced
heirship because it serves the purpose of protecting vulnerable
persons while preserving the individual autonomy of choice. Both
are sound policy arguments that warrant deep and sober reflection.
The former, though, carries an intrinsic quality of tradition that
seems out of place when evaluating legal policy.
Moreover, the civil law tradition cannot be reduced simply to
the distinction that we have statutes and codes. Let me provide
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another example. In 1962, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted a
new methodology for deciding tort negligence cases called duty-
risk analysis. 6 The traditional civilian analysis requires a showing
of "fault" before delict liability attaches. 17 The duty-risk analysis
therefore splits the elements required to prove fault into four
distinct elements-cause, duty, breach, and damages--and
engages in a policy analysis in evaluating their application.' 8 One
might well conclude with Professor Vernon Palmer that this is
merely a wolf in sheep's clothing; though the conclusion may
retain a civilian root-fault--its antecedent (the breach of duty) is
purely an American common law innovation.
19
16. The court began its duty-risk analysis trend in a case called Dixie Drive
It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 137 So. 2d 298 (La. 1962). See
also Pepper v. Triplet, 864 So. 2d 181 (La. 2004) (creating a doctrine of strict
liability that is an amalgamation of civil law and American tort law). Duty-risk
analysis was spawned by policy-oriented academics such as Leon Greene and
Wex Malone. See Leon Green, RATIONALES OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 11-13
(1927); Wex Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus American
Beverage Company, 30 LA. L. REv. 363 (1970).
17. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2006) ("Every act whatever of man
that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair
it.").
18. See Timothy J. McNamara, The Duties and Risks of the Duty-Risk
Analysis, 44 LA. L. REv. 1227, 1233-34 (1984). The author stated:
The general consensus is that six identifiable socioeconomic
considerations influence the decision of whether the defendant owed a
legal duty to a particular plaintiff not to create this specific risk of harm
by the precise conduct which the court has already concluded was a
cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries. Obviously, there is interplay
among these factors as the judge ponders his decision. As a
practitioner, the writer wishes that every judge would tape these six
considerations to his wrist like a quarterback so that, when he has a
visceral feeling as to who should win, he can at least check off each of
these elements to determine exactly why he approves the position of
one side or another and at the same time make sure he has not
overlooked an important consideration. These six factors are: (1) ease
of association, (2) administrative considerations, (3) economic
considerations, (4) moral considerations, (5) type of activity, and (6)
precedent or historical considerations.
Id.
19. See Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Fate of the General Clause in a
Cross-Cultural Setting: The Tort Experience of Louisiana, 46 LOY. L. REV. 535,
566 (2000) ("[I]n the formulation of the question of negligent wrongfulness,
Louisiana is, as far as I can see, in the mainstream of American Common Law,
not the Civil Law.").
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What Palmer brushes by, however, is the type of analysis
undertaken by judges applying this duty-risk analysis. Indeed, the
analysis undertaken by judges is a policy analysis--the very
analysis that renders legislation superior to decisions-and that
undergirds the essence of a civilian approach to law. 20 Duty-risk
analysis begins with the civilian requirement for fault, interposes
the questions of duty and cause, and invokes a policy analysis in its
solution. Palmer's assumption that institutions "compare" and
therefore assimilate misses the truly civilian work being
undertaken by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
The supreme court's use of duty-risk analysis tracks several
fundamental viewpoints by which Louisiana jurists view
themselves. First, duty-risk analysis starts and ends in the Code.
Professor Crawford's comments, noting the scarcity of Code
provisions in the area of delict, emphasize that the judicial role is
one of interpretation, first, last, and throughout:
The codal texts governing delict are so spare and general
that the court must as a practical matter write most of the
tort law with its own pen, though it is done in the name of
interpretation. The Civil Code requires the court to resort
to justice, reason, and prevailing usages. Both Grny and
Planiol support the theory that it is right and necessary for
the court to resort to its own mind and conscience to write
in detail the enormous superstructure of tort law that rests
upon the codal texts.
21
20. See William E. Crawford, TORT LAW § 1.11, in 12 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE 21 (2000). Professor Crawford stated:
According to strict civil law theory, legislation is the law and judicial
opinion is only an interpretation thereof. The functional result of the
axiom of jurisprudence constante is not unlike the functional effect of
the common law doctrine of stare decisis, which mandates the court to
remain faithful to the earlier decisions that establish a rule of law.
Under the Civilian notion, the interpretation of the legislation must also
remain consistent.
Id. I might also remind Professor Palmer that Louisiana judges are elected;
many times their function is as much legislative as it is judicial. Of course, he
might also remind me that so too are many common law judges. Nevertheless,
Louisiana judges certainly appear more willing to apply policy concerns to
matters as Professor Palmer himself recognizes implicitly.
21. Id. (citations omitted).
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Second, the decision to move towards duty-risk analysis and
away from proximate cause as a theory of liability indicates the
state's willingness to be distinct in its legal institutions. In short,
the Louisiana Supreme Court demonstrated that the state's identity
as unique amongst its forty-nine sister states empowers, not limits,
its ability to interpret the state's law.
All of this goes to infer that "[w]e inhabit a nomos."22 As
Robert Cover famously "uncovered" for us in the 1980s, law's
nomos is tethered to the narratives that are told about it:
A legal tradition is hence part and parcel of a complex
normative world. The tradition includes not only a corpus
juris, but also a language and a mythos--narratives in
which the corpus juris is located by those whose wills act
upon it. These myths establish the paradigms for behavior.
They build relations between the normative and the
material universe, between the constraints of reality and the
demands of an ethic. These myths establish a repertoire of
moves--a lexicon of normative action-that may be
combined into meaningful patterns culled from the
meaningful patterns of the past. The normative meaning
that has inhered in the patterns of the past will be found in
the history of ordinary legal doctrine at work in mundane
affairs; in utopian and messianic yearnings, imaginary
shapes given to a less resistant reality; in apologies for
power and privilege and in the critiques that may be leveled
in the justificatory enterprises of the law. 23
Our Louisiana nomos is distinct, it is French, and it has a Code.
Our nomos is distinctive from other states. The supreme court's
willingness to part with its sister states in the area of proximate
cause was empowered by a consciousness that embraced the
uniqueness of Louisiana law. Without such a perception, our legal
system would be civilian in name only, having shed any and all
likenesses of our civil law system.
Our nomos is French. The French connection in Louisiana has
deep roots. Our first Civil Code was in French with an English
22. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4, 4 (1983).
23. Id. at 9.
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24translation. Even if the original Code contained a stronger Spanish
influence, its French nature still transcended the document.25
Moreover, the Louisiana State Law Institute undertook three major
translation projects of notable French authors: in 1959, after nearly
twenty-five years of planning, the Law Institute translated into
English Marcel Planiol's Traitg Elmentaire de Droit Civil, titled
simply as Planiol, Civil Law Treatise.26 Six years later, the Law
Institute unveiled its English translation of Charles Aubry's Cours
de Droit Civil Frangais. Four years after that, it produced Frangois
Gdny's Mgthode d'interprdtation et sources en droitpriv positif.
The driving force behind these projects was a recognition that
there was an intimate relation between Louisiana law and French
law, even if not always exactly the same. The forward to the Planiol
treatise states:
Louisiana, a civil law state, with a Civil Code based on the
Code Napoleon, has relied heavily in the past upon the
writings of the French legal scholars for the doctrinal
interpretation and consistent development of a code of
general law. Although one hundred fifty years have passed
since the adoption of the Code of 1808, Louisiana has
produced no commentary on its Civil Code as a whole, and
only a few of the subjects covered thereby have been
discussed in any work that properly might be called a
treatise. Within the last generation of law reviews which
were established at the Louisiana State, Loyola, and Tulane
Universities have done much to answer the need for
objective discussions of the provisions of the Code in the
light of their underlying philosophy and historical
development [sic]. Nevertheless, the great wealth of
material of this nature can still be found only in the French
Commentaries. In the early days under the Civil Code these
commentaries were, in effect, Louisiana doctrine, for the
French language was then used to a very considerable extent
by the legal profession. But with the passing of the years its
24. See LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE (1808).
25. Dainow, supra note 12, at 177.
26. For a description of the process undertaken in approving the project and
the obstacles, see id. at 178.
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use has continued to decline, as has likewise the number of
Louisianans sufficiently schooled in French to be able to
avail themselves readily of French doctrinal materials. On
the other hand, the succession of time has not lessened to
any appreciable extent the importance of such discussions to
the legal profession in Louisiana. Louisiana's law reports
and other legal writings give ample positive evidence of how
we can profit from the writings of the French, and there is no
lack of evidence, of a negative sort, that a more complete
knowledge of such materials might have been a source of
great illumination to us in many cases. Of the 2281 articles
in the Code Napoleon, approximately 1800 are contained in
full or in part in the Louisiana Revised Civil Code of 1870.
By far the greatest number appear in our Code without
change in substance.27
Finally, our nomos is identified by our Code. The very first
value that we pass on to succeeding generations is the importance of
the Code. The Code is important because it defines who we are,
what we have, and how we use it. In the words of Colonel John
Tucker, the Code is the:
[M]ost important book in your library, ... because it ushers
you into society as a member of your parent's family and
regulates your life until you reach maturity. It then prescribes
the rules for the establishment of your own family by
marriage and having children, and for the disposition of your
estate when you die, either by law or by testament, subject to
law. It tells you how you can acquire, own, use and dispose
of property onerously or gratuitously. It provides the rules for
most of the special contracts necessary for the conduct of
nearly all of your relations with your fellowmen: sales, loans
(with or without security), leases, usufructs, and servitudes;
and finally, all of the rights and obligations governing your
relations with your neighbor and fellowman generally.
28
27. J. Denson Smith, Forward to Marcel Planiol, TRArrT ELEMENTAIRE DE
DROIT CIviL 3 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 1959).
28. John H. Tucker, Forward to I LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE XXI (A.N.
Yiannopoulos ed., 2003).
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The Code prevented the Louisiana State Law Institute from
adopting the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") in 1967. It also
required certain large scale revisions in 1870 following the most
significant reclassification of persons and property in modem
history: the mandated ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution changed
more than the state of race relations, but completely reorganized
social relations and property regimes. In Louisiana, that
reorganization started in the Code. The Code captivates our
attention in Louisiana, perhaps because it is so logical. It is also a
part of what identifies us as Louisiana lawyers.
Principally, we know the nomos and its features by the stories
we tell. Law is as much about the stories that are told in the
past-the formative narratives-as it is about the hungering for the
future---"the messianic yearnings." In a certain sense then, Lorio's
title mentioned above is exactly right: the arcane institutions of the
past are bright predictors for the future.
The narratives that are told tend to shape communities as well as
legal norms. We do not live in isolation from one another. Rather, a
communal character inures to people who share the same stories.
No person is an island in a normative story-even those who choose
to withdraw from social standards do so within the context of a
shared story-one they happen to reject but one of which they
nevertheless are still a part. "The part that you or I choose to play
may be singular, but the fact that we can locate it in a common
'script' renders it 'sane'--a warrant that we share a nomos.
'
"
29
One obvious inference then is that the Louisiana civil law
tradition does not exist in isolation from either its past or its future.
Indeed, a brief skimming of the latest Louisiana Law Review,
Tulane Law Review, or Loyola Law Review, will provide
undoubtedly an article in which the central theme is that "X law" is
faithful to the civilian tradition and should be continued; or that the
same law is either unique to the point of embarrassment or to the
point of supremacy and therefore should be changed to conform
with the rest of the states or maintained as better than the common
law alternatives. We are constantly in the market of comparing the
29. Cover, supra note 22, at 8.
[Vol. 67464
NOMOS OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL LA W
institutions we have against others dissimilar to us to decide whether
the tradition is better served by change or by remaining the same.
An even more obvious point is that the nomos naturalizes its
institutions. That is, the tradition can grow in ways that are different
from its tradition but never without some symbolic glance towards
it. So, the Louisiana State Law Institute's decisions to publish
translations of the French treatises by Marcel Planiol, Charles Aubry
and Charles Rau, and Frangois Gdny indicate, if nothing else, a
passive reflection that at some deep point the Louisiana narrative
begins in French law-the substance of which some Louisiana
scholars have contested, but whose normative power they do not
cross. Nevertheless, the culture tells us that French sources are
important even if the main body of the law reflects other cultures.
The language variance has the same effect: despite the fact that the
Civil Code was amended in 1973 to anglicize the third party
contract, courts and lawyers still refer to stipulations pour autrui,
though I dare say not many speak French.3° Similarly, in Louisiana
we have projets that consider changes to the Louisiana Constitution,
not projects or reports. Thus, the nomos takes variations that
otherwise would feel awkward and unstable, and incorporates them
as if they were a natural part of the institution.
All of these factors tend to be worked out by the narratives that
help shape the nomos. I offer two narratives that reveal the nomos;
there are certainly others. I chose these two because they represent
the collision of institutions and ideals. The first is the narrative of
the Code Noir and Louisiana slave law. The second narrative is the
adoption of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in
Louisiana. Both demonstrate elements of the nomos and how we
begin to formulate an identity as a civilian state.
30. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gary, 924 So. 2d 428 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2006);
Barnhill v. Remington Oil & Gas Corp., 918 So. 2d 52 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2005);
Joseph Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 2 of Parish of St. Mary, 923 So. 2d 27 (La. App.
1st Cir. 2005). Indeed, since 1990, fifty-four cases have used the term
stipulation pour autrui in the place of the anglicized "third party beneficiary
contract." See, e.g., cases cited supra this note.
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II. LOUISIANA NARRATIVES
A. Narrative 1-Louisiana Slavery and the Code Noir
Slavery came to Louisiana in the early eighteenth century,
relatively later than the rest of North America. 3' Louisiana was
colonized by the French in the early seventeenth century. Reasons
for the delay include: the French preference for mining over
agriculture; the preference for using slavery for building
infrastructure; and the fact that the driving motivation for obtaining
Louisiana was not economic but political: the French did not want
the British to have it.32 In fact, it was not until the Spanish gained
the territory in 1763 that agricultural slavery began to flourish in
the colony.
Despite the fact that the French were not committed to
agricultural development of the territory, slavery was still an
institution desired by the French colonials. In 1704, the colonists
in Louisiana began petitioning the government for the introduction
of slave labor to clear the land.34 With the introduction of large
numbers of slaves into the territory, new laws had to be shaped to
control the slavery system. Thus, in 1724, the Code Noir was
introduced into the vast French colony.35 The Code Noir regulated
31. Grady Kilman, SLAVERY AND FORCED LABOR IN COLONIAL LOUISIANA
1699-1803, at 10 (1972).
32. Id. at 5-13.
33. France claimed the Louisiana territory in the late seventeenth century,
and held the territory until the end of the Seven Years' War. Frangois-Xavier
Martin, HISTORY OF LOUISIANA 92-93 (3d ed. Pelican Publishing Co. 1975)
(1882). Then, in 1763, France ceded to Spain the vast territory--first by
secretive agreement, and then officially in the Treaty of Paris. Id. King Louis
XV informed the Superior Council by letter dated April 21, 1764, of the ceding
of the Louisiana Territory to Spain. Id.
34. Id.
35. The 1724 Code Noir was specific to Louisiana, though its antecedent
was a 1685 codification designed for French possessions in the West Indies. See
Hans W. Baade, The Gens de Couleur in Louisiana: Comparative Slave Law in
Microcosm, 18 CARDOZA L. REV. 535, 541 (1996); Vernon Valentine Palmer,
The Origins and Authors of the French Code Noir, 56 LA. L. REV. 363, 367
(1995).
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everything touching the institution of slavery, including religion, 3637 39 40
nourishment and care, 37 control,38 prosecution,39 status, seizure,
and emancipation of African slaves. The Code Noir remained the
central piece of slavery legislation even after the French lost
control of the territory.4' It is this code-the Code Noir--that
became the lasting legal force behind the slavery laws. In contrast
to the Civil Code's "ushering" of persons into society, the Code
Noir specifically exempted a certain class of persons from
42society, but it directed their affairs in much the same pattern as
the Civil Code.
The Code Noir was introduced into the Louisiana territory in
1725. Over the course of one hundred fifty years it was altered and
36. See CODE NoIR arts. 2-5, 11 (1724). The author, in a previous piece,
described the relation of the Code Noir to the revolutionary atmosphere
surrounding the territory. In that piece, notable cases applying the articles of the
Code Noir are cited. See Marc L. Roark, Louisiana Colonial Slavery
Law-Revolution, Property and Race (copy on file with author).
37. See CODE NOIR arts. 18-21 (1724).
38. See CODE NOIR arts. 25-28 (1724).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Re Indian, 4 LA. HIST. Q. 355 (1729) ("Petition for
emancipation: 'Duplesis, settler at Natchitoches, holds a "kind of will". . . by late
Frangois Viard, who freed an osage woman slave and reserved 100 pistoles in
behalf of her catholic instruction .... Attorney General approves emancipation...
but the black code forbids cash legacies to a slave."').
41. The Code Noir was revested in 1769, after O'Reilly assumed control of
the territory. Hans W. Baade, The Spanish Law of Slavery in Spanish Louisiana
1769-1803, in II THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE BICENTENNIAL SERIES IN
LOUISIANA HISTORY: THE SPANISH PRESENCE IN LOUISIANA 1763-1803, at 371
(1996) (citing AGI, Santo Domingo, Leg. 2543 f. 195 (available on microform
at Loyola University, New Orleans)).
42. While the Civil Code told persons how to own property, the Code Noir
specifically exempted slaves from property ownership. In the Code Noir, the
slaves were the property. See, e.g., Dupuy v. Veillon, 8 LA. HIST. Q. 154 (1770),
reported in Helen Tunnicliff Catterall, III JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING
AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 423 (2d ed. 1998) ("[I]f he has not paid...
apprehend one of his slaves or his person."); Morico v. Belier, 7 LA. HIST. Q. 539
(1770), reported in Catterall, supra, at 422 (seizing a slave and placing in public
prison until the debt of the master was paid). See also CODE NOIR § X (1806)
("And be it further enacted that Slaves shall always be reputed and considered
Real estates . . ... "). Thus its regulations were not empowering but rather
inapplicable. Both codes regulated marriage and children. Compare generally
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 87-154 (1825), with CODE NOiR § 9 (1724).
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amended regularly but continued to maintain the corpus of its
organization. For example, the initial Code Noir was divided into
seven parts: Religion; Clothing and Nourishment; Police; Crimes
and Punishments; Witnesses, Donations, Successions, and Actions;
Legal Seizures, Slaves as Movable Property; and Grants of
Liberty.43 When a new "black code" was desired, the drafters
turned to the former Code Noir as a model. 4  While retaining
many of the substantive provisions of the previous Code Noir, the
new code was divided into two primary sections: (1) general
provisions; and (2) crime and punishment.45
Both versions of the Code Noir were designed to provide
owners of slaves with direction regarding every aspect of a slave's
life. The code's purpose was holistic; that is, it meant to treat
every aspect of slavery by reference to a single compendium of
laws. But the stories we tell about the Code Noir demonstrate that
it was as much a civil code of slavery as it was a collection of laws.
While the fact that the compendium of laws regulating one area
were encompassed in one complete code certainly suggests a
similarity to the Civil Code,46 the use of the Code Noir as a source
for the later Civil Code of 1806 serves as more compelling
evidence of its civilian character, regardless of how modest that
role was. Amongst other sources, the Code Noir served to create a
source of instruction for the territorial reorganization of its laws
and structure.47 Previously, the Code Noir served as a source for
the infamous O'Reilly's Code under Spanish provincial rule.48
43. See Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Authors and Sources of the Original
Code Noir, in THE LOUISIANA CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE: CRITIQUES OF
CODIFICATION IN A MIXED JURISDICTION 121 n.54 (2005).
44. John T. Hood, Jr., A Crossroad in Louisiana History, 22 LA. L. REV.
709,711 (1962).
45. Compare CODE NOIR (1724), with CODE NOIR (1806), in Louis Moreau-
Lislet, Source Notes, in A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS Now IN FORCE IN THE
TERRITORY OF ORLEANS 1808, at 100-32 (1968).
46. See David Gruning, Codifying Civil Law: Principle and Practice, 51
Loy. L. REV. 57, 57 (2005).
47. Vernon Valentine Palmer, The French Connection and the Spanish
Perception: Historical Debates and Contemporary Evaluation of French
Influence on Louisiana Civil Law, 63 LA. L. REV. 1067, 1073 n.13 (2003). In
addition to the Code Noir, other sources included were "Las Siete Partidas,
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The decision to incorporate provisions into a code is a matter
of contemporary judgment, reflecting the currents of the time. But
the decision regarding whether such inclusions reveal faithful
decisions are issues of reflection that appear most contestable from
afar. Notably, no one contends or contended that the Code Noir
was anything but a civilian extension to the law of slavery. From
its structure to its sources, the civilian character transcends the
Code Noir.
What we do debate, however, is whether the Code Noir's
sources are purely French or reflect other traditions. As discussed
above, this transcends through language and institutions that have
long since left the ordinary usage of social construction, but which
retain significance in the legal identity of the state. Nowhere is
this story more contested than with regard to the nature of slave
laws in Louisiana. That is, no one contests that the laws were
civilian; rather, the issue that has been debated is a question of
which civilian character: French, Spanish, or Roman.
The crux of the story requires a brief description of the
historical facts relating to the transfer of the territory from France
to Spain and then back to France again. France claimed the
Louisiana territory in the late seventeenth century, and held the
territory until the end of the Seven Years' War.4 9 Then, in 1763,
France ceded to Spain the vast territory--first by secretive
agreement,50 and then officially in the Treaty of Paris. 5' King
Febrero, the Institutes, Blackstone, Justinian's Digest, Curia Philipica, Gaius,
the Fuero Real, the Ordinances of Bilbao, and local Louisiana statutes." Id.
48. H. Ward Fontenot, The Louisiana Judicial System and the Fusion of
Cultures, 63 LA. L. REV. 1149, 1155 (2003).
49. Martin, supra note 33, at 77-78. The Seven Years' War, also called the
French and Indian War, pitted France against Britain primarily, but also
involved Spain, the American colonies, and the Native Americans. See id at
88-95.
50. See Clive Perry, Editor's Note to Preliminary Act of Cession between
France and Spain ("Treaty of Fontainebleau") (Nov. 3, 1762), 42 CONSOL. T.S.
239. Scholars have offered several viable reasons for French cession of
Louisiana to Spain, including: the unloading of an economic drain from the
French economy, the compensation for Spanish loss of Florida in the Seven
Years' War, and even a pre-orchestrated bargained for exchange for Spain's
alliance against Britain in the same war. See, e.g., Author S. Aiton, The
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Louis XV informed the Superior Council by letter dated April 21,
1764, of the ceding of the Louisiana Territory to Spain. 52
On March 5, 1766, the first Spanish Governor, Don Antonio de
Ulloa, arrived in New Orleans and established Spanish provincial
rule.53 Ulloa maintained French political structures, even issuing
his orders through the French Commandant Phillip Aubrey. Those
that resided in the territory, particularly those of Creole descent, 5
4
feared that the new Spanish Administration would bring a
complete denial of their rights as colonists. 55 Additionally, the
French colonists felt betrayed by their king as mere pawns of
politics. The French colonists envisioned not only the present loss
of country but the potential loss of property. 56  Gayarrd, a
Diplomacy of the Louisiana Cession, in 2 THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE
BICENTENNIAL SERIES IN LOUISIANA HISTORY: THE SPANISH PRESENCE IN
LOUISIANA 1763-1803, at 23 (1996).
51. See Clive Perry, Editor's Note to Definitive Treaty of Peace Between
France, Great Britain and Spain ("Treaty of Paris") (Feb. 10, 1763), 42 CONSOL.
T.S. 279, 324 [hereinafter Treaty of Paris]. Interestingly, the Treaty of Paris
does not cede Louisiana to Spain directly. See id. Rather, the Treaty's
significance is the securing of France's possession in Louisiana to validate the
earlier transfer by the Preliminary Act of Cession between France and Spain.
See id. The Treaty of Paris only draws a line of separation in the Americas
between French and British possessions. Id. at 325-26.
52. See Letter from King Louis XV, King of France, to Mr. D'Abbadie,
Governor of Louisiana (Apr. 21, 1764), translated in Charles E. Gayarrd, 2
HISTORY OF LOUISIANA: THE FRENCH DOMINATION 109-12 (AMS Press 3d ed.
1972) (1885).
53. Gilbert C. Din, SPANIARDS, PLANTERS, AND SLAVES: THE SPANISH
REGULATION OF SLAVERY IN LOUISIANA 36, 38 (1999).
54. At the time, Louisiana was composed of persons from Creole, English,
and Spanish decent. Indeed, the territory identified itself as French, though its
people were from varying nationalities. See Gayarrd, supra note 52, at 185.
55. Note that King Louis XV somewhat presumes this inference in his letter
to Mr. D'Abbadie and reassures the colonists that their property rights are
secure, stating:
I hope . . . that the titles of the inhabitants to their property shall be
confirmed in accordance with the concessions made by the Governors
and ordaining commissaries of said colony ... hoping moreover that
his Catholic Majesty will be pleased to give his subjects of Louisiana
the marks of protection and good will which they have been made more
effectual, if not counteracted by the calamities of war.
Id. at 111-12.
56. See id. at 113.
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Louisiana historian, summarizes succinctly the French colonial
apprehensions of this transfer:
As Frenchmen, they felt that a deep wound had been
inflicted on their pride by the severing in twain of
Louisiana, and the distribution of its mutilated parts
between England and Spain. As men, they felt the
degradation of being bartered away as marketable objects;
they felt the loss of their national character and rights, and
the humiliation of their sudden transformation into
Spaniards or Englishmen without their consent. As
colonists, as property owners, as members of a civilized
society, they were agitated by all the apprehensions
consequent upon a change of laws, manners, customs,
habits and government.
57
Thus, in 1768, six hundred plantation owners and merchants
sent a petition to the Superior Council asking that Governor Ulloa
be expelled from the territory, and that certain rights and liberties
be restored.58  Governor Ulloa was removed, and, at least
temporarily, the colonists believed that repatriation was in their
future. Those hopes were short-lived. Spain responded by
replacing the removed Governor Ulloa with Governor Alejandro
O'Reilly. O'Reilly acted swiftly to punish insurgents and restore
Spanish rule. One of Governor O'Reilly's first acts was to replace
59the French legal structures with a visibly Spanish presence.
Specifically, O'Reilly dissolved the Superior Council, believing it
to be a tool of the colonists towards insurrection.
From the start, the Spanish were viewed with disdain by
French settlers who continued to identify more with the mire
patrie than they did with their colonial governors. 60  O'Reilly's
57. Id.
58. Id. at 192.
59. See Ordinances and Instructions of Don Alexander O'Reilly, 2 LA. L.J.
1, 1 (1841) (translating three orders of Governor O'Reilly relating to the
substitution of Spanish Law for French Law and structure, enacted and
published in French November 25, 1769). See also Kate Wallach,
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SOURCES ROMAN,
FRENCH, AND SPANISH 67 (1955).
60. Ernest R. Liljegren, Jacobinism in Spanish Louisiana, 1792-1797, 22
LA. HIST. Q. 47,47 (1939).
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punishment of the insurrectionists of 1768 did not ease the tension
as French-Louisianans referred to him as "Bloody O'Reilly," a
practice that continued long after his rule as governor ceased.6'
Though French citizens did indeed prefer the mother country to
Spanish provincial rule, those feelings were clearly simple
nationalism. Indeed, the Spanish did more to assist colonists in
creating a viable Louisiana economy. And Spain was sensitive to
the French people's desire for their mother country as long as that
sensitivity did not spread to insurrection. A 1779 and 1782 trade
cdula, which permitted direct commerce between France and
Louisiana, seemed to placate French citizens and temper reactions
against the Spanish.62
Relating to slavery, O'Reilly continued the enforcement of the
Code Noir, expressing "admiration for the Code's 'wisdom and
piety.', 63  The question that has been debated most recently is
whether the Code Noir continued a French version of rule or
whether it was supplanted by a Spanish version. A follow-up
question seeks to uncover the normative value of the Code Noir.
To the first, Hans Baade has pointed to several provisions of
Alfonso el Sabio's Siete Partidas 64 that, although sharing a
common Roman heritage, did not enter the French Code Noir of
1724.65 For example, the Siete Partidas included a provision that
declared slavery as contrary to "natural reason." 66 Similarly, under
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Baade, supra note 41, at 371 (citing AGI, Santo Domingo, Leg. 2594 f.
58 (available on microfilm at Loyola University, New Orleans)).
64. Literally translated the "Seven Departures," the Siete Partidas was
compiled in 1265 by King Alfonso X, and governed peninsular Spain. See
Dylan 0. Drummond et al., The Rule of Capture in Texas--Still So
Misunderstood After All These Years, 37 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1, 31 (2004). See
also David Gruning, Mapping Society Through Law: Louisiana Civil Law
Recodified, 19 TUL. EUR. & CIv. L.F. 1, 5 (2004) (discussing the role of the Siete
Partidas in the Louisiana civil law tradition).
65. See Baade, supra note 41, at 368.
66. See THE LAWS OF LAS SIETE PARTIDAS, WHICH ARE STILL IN FORCE IN
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 581 (L. Moreau Lislet & Henry Carleton trans., 1820)
[hereinafter SIETE PARTIDAS] ("Slavery is a condition and siate of things
established anciently by nations, by which men who were naturally free, are
made slaves, and put under the dominion of others, contrary to natural reason.").
See also Baade, supra note 41, at 368.
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traditional Spanish law, "slaves were entitled to file complaints of
cruelty against their masters," and were entitled to judicial sale
when cruelty was established.67 Baade points to these early
provisions as a source of more favorable treatment towards slaves
by Spanish law than French; indeed, citing to the Informe, Baade
notes that the Spanish perceived that in "modem times, slaves
received 'incomparably milder' treatment in Spanish overseas
possessions than in the American colonies of France, England or
the Netherlands," built around a "more favorable ratio of freedman
to slaves in Spanish possessions." 68 As Spain gained control of the
territory, some of these incidents became incorporated into the
Louisiana slave laws. Baade argues that the Spanish laws of
Castile soon replaced all law in Louisiana, including the Code
Noir.69 Baade's contention is supported by Raphael Rabalais, who
concludes, among other things, that the early Louisiana courts
cited Spanish codes more than they did French codes, cited French
treatises only slightly more than they did Spanish treatises, and
cited Spanish statutes more than they did French statutes.70 This
67. See SIETE PARTIDAS, supra note 66, at 584-85:
We likewise say that if a man be so cruel to his slaves, as to cause them
to die of hunger, or strike or chastise them so severely with the whip,
that they cannot bear it; they may then complain to the judge, who
ought, in virtue of his office, to enquire into the truth of the facts, and if
he finds them to be so, he ought to sell the slaves, and give the price to
their master. And this ought to be done in such a manner, that the
slaves shall never again come under the power or dominion of the
person, by whose fault they were sold.
See also Baade, supra note 41, at 368.
68. Baade, supra note 41, at 368 (citing Informe del Consejo de Indias
Acerca de la Observancia de la Real Cedula de 31 de Mayo de 1789 Sobre la
Educacion, Trato y Ocupaciones de los Escalvos, reprinted in J.A. Saco, 3
HISTORIADE LA ESCLAVAITUD DE LA RAZA AFRICANA EN EL NUEVO MUNDO Y
EN SPECtAL EN LOS PAISES AMERiCO-HISPANOS 247-78 (1938)).
69. But see Beard v. Poydras, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 348, 366-67 (La. 1916)
(referencing the proclamation issued by Governor O'Reilly continuing the Code
Noir's effect in the territory: "the French Law, called the Code Noir... was in
force in this country. To establish this, a proclamation is produced, issued by
Don Alessandro de O'Reilly, of the 27th of August, 1769, whereby it is
continued in force.").
70. Raphael J. Rabalais, The Influence of Spanish Laws and Treatises on the
Jurisprudence of Louisiana 1762-1828, 42 LA. L. REV. 1485, 1504 (1982).
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approach was described fully by Professor Rodolfo Batiza in the
early 1970s.7 '
The Baade/Rabalais/Batiza position is countered by A.N.
Yiannopoulos, who argues that the Spanish laws were less than
enforceable against a resilient French population:
Nevertheless, there are indications of a strong attachment
by the French population to its own laws and customs.
Rather than adhering to the official Spanish legal system,
the French population frequently settled affairs
extrajudicially under French laws, customs, and usages.
This state of affairs continued until the retrocession of the
Louisiana territory to France on October 1, 1800, by the
Treaty of San Idelfonso. France did not assume
sovereignty until November 20, 1803. During the twenty-
day period of French control, Pierre de Laussat, as colonial
prefect for Napoleon, abolished the Spanish authorities and
established a municipal government in Louisiana. There
was not sufficient time to organize a new legal system;
Laussat's only change in the law was the reintroduction of
the French code noir and the repeal of the Spanish slave
legislation. When the United States took possession of the
Louisiana territory on December 20, 1803, the bulk of the
preexisting laws were in force.72
Louisiana was a French colony with a French history. Of
course, what the citizens did and what the government enforced are
oftentimes different questions. Whether the courts applied French
law or Spanish law in the territory would seem to answer this
debate. Surprisingly, this did not seem to present the difficulty that
one might expect. Palmer notes:
O'Reilly had issued a proclamation that all proceedings in
civil and in criminal matters would be according to the laws
of Castille and of the Indies. By all accounts, this change
of substantive law did not have a great impact because of
71. See Rudolfo Batiza, The Actual Sources of the Louisiana Projet of
1823:. A GeneralAnalytical Survey, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1978).
72. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Requiem for a Civil Code: A Commemorative
Essay, 78 TuL. L. REV. 379, 382-83 (2003).
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the common origin, hence, the similarity of laws between
Spain and France. As a consequence, no noticeable
disruption occurred when the courts began applying the
new body of laws. Nevertheless, O'Reilly issued a decree
in 1769 abolishing French law. It provided that thereafter
the laws in effect would be a compilation referred to as the
"Code O'Reilly." It was a combination which borrowed
from the Laws of the Indies, the Siete Partidas, and the
code noir. Although there were occasional adjustments of
the judicial structure and of the substantive laws of
Louisiana over the period of Spanish rule which lasted
some forty years, the basic form of the judicial system
remained unchanged.73
The sources of the laws may have been Spanish, but the
colonial nomos was French.
There are principally two ways to address this narrative. One
is purely historical. That is, the legal scholar can engage the texts,
identify the provisions that seem most French, Spanish, or Roman,
and argue vigorously that those texts create some institutional
identity for the territory. This has been the primary means of
debate to this point.74 The second way is to consider what that
73. Fontenot, supra note 48, at 1155.
74. Indeed, both French and Spanish legal heritages derive from the Roman
civil law system. See Baade, supra note 41, at 371. Much ink has been spilled
(on many, many law review pages) regarding the debate over whether the 1724
Code Noir reflected a Romanist tradition or a French Caribbean innovation. I
take the position that the Code Noir was a distinctly French scheme, but with
distinct Romanist influences. Compare Palmer, supra note 47 (distinguishing
several points of Roman law from the Code Noir), with Hans W. Baade, The
Bifurcated Romanist Tradition of Slavery in Louisiana, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1481,
1482-85 (1996) (maintaining a Romanist influence on the Code Noir sources).
See also Alan Watson, The Origins of the Code Noir Revisited, 71 TUL. L. REV.
1041, 1051 (1997) (conceding sources as non-Roman, but also reasserting
certain Romanist influences). Nevertheless, the sources of the laws as French
colonial or Roman make little difference to the ultimate disposition of this
article.
Both the French and Spanish laws regulating slavery were influenced
substantially by the Roman system of law, which also legislated rules for
slavery. See, e.g., W.W. Buckland, THE ROMAN LAW OF SLAVERY: THE
CONDITION OF THE SLAVE IN PRIVATE LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN
(2000); Alan Watson, ROMAN SLAVE LAW (1987). Both Watson's and
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debate and the accompanying historical facts have to say about the
nature of Louisiana law. That is, can there be a nomos inside this
debate?
This comment has suggested that the nomos is identified by
three factors. First is the prevalence of a code-centric debate. For
example, the fact that the Code Noir is in a structured code
certainly aids our argument, but even if it were not, other
phenomena warrant the same conclusion. So, for example, one
could draw the conclusion that the Code Noir's past, the confusion
regarding what legal institution was dominant, and the need for
order contributed to a Civil Code being adopted. Consider Roger
Ward's argument:
Louisiana's decision to adopt a civil code was based on
necessity. Because of its motley colonial past, Louisiana's
legal system was actually an interesting amalgamation of
Spanish and French law. The Spanish law in effect at the
time of the transfer of the territory to the United States was
composed of eleven different codes, containing more than
20,000 laws, with many conflicting provisions. Relatively
few Spanish legal treatises were available to help
Louisianans understand and interpret these laws. Likewise,
remnants of French law such as the Customs of Paris,
Buckland's treatments of Roman law slavery provide detailed analysis of the
Roman laws regulating the institution. For example, Judith Schafer draws the
obvious connection between the Roman law of redhibition and redhibition
allowed under the Code Noir. Judith Kelleher Schafer, Roman Roots of the
Louisiana Law of Slavery: Emancipation in American Louisiana, 1803-1857, 56
LA. L. REV. 409, 409 (1995) ("The most important survival of Roman law in the
law of slavery in antebellum Louisiana was the concept of redhibition.").
Another aspect of Roman slave law transmogrified to the new world context was
the notion of "obsequium," or respect for one's former patron. See DIG.
37:15.1-11 (Paulus, Ad Edictum 9). Though the tradition of showing respect to
one's former master is traceable to Roman ancestry, the practice was mutated to
include respect for all white persons in the Code Noir of 1806. See CODE NOIR
§ XXXX (1806) ("And it be further enacted that Free People of Color ought
never to strike white people nor presume to conceive themselves equal to the
white; but on the contrary that they ought to yield to them in every occasion and
never speak nor answer to them but with respect under the penalty of
imprisonment according to the nature of the offense.").
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Ordinance of 1667, Royal Edicts, and the Code Noir were
interspersed in the Spanish law governing the territory.
75
The Code Noir was certainly a part of this background-for better
or worse.
Second, we have also argued that there is a perception of
distinctiveness that exists in Louisiana. In the area of slave law,
that norm has manifested itself towards making value-weighted
judgments of which system was more humane. For example,
consider Vernon Palmer's argument:
The one constant of barbaric laws is that they did not seem
harsh to the barbarians. The Roman law of the talion--an
eye for an eye, tooth for tooth, etc.--originally seemed
equitable compared to the unlimited right of revenge that it
superseded. The talion introduced for the first time the
requirement of limited and proportionate response. The
Code Noir, which the French monarch introduced into
Louisiana in 1724, was apparently a well-intentioned
attempt to ameliorate the condition of slaves. As there
were previously no controls governing how a master might
treat a slave, certain elements of enlightened society
regarded the Code Noir as humane and reformatory. Both
the lex talionis and the Code Noir, however, are victims of
moral and historical relativism. These "improvements"
will always be scorned for the inequity they presupposed
rather than the incidental evils they suppressed.
At times, our nomos of distinctiveness has caused those on the
outside to also laud our attempt to be human, in the face of owning
humans. Consider Jonathan Bush's reading of the historical
account:
There were also no systematic slave codes in the English
colonies, in contrast to such other New World texts as the
French Code Noir or the Codigo negro caroleno of Santo
75. Roger K. Ward, Comment, The French Language in Louisiana Law and
Legal Education: A Requiem, 57 LA. L. REv. 1283, 1302 (1997).
76. Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Many Guises of Equity in a Mixed
Jurisdiction: A Functional View of Equity in Louisiana, 69 TUL. L. REv. 7, 29
n.73 (1994) (citations omitted).
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Domingo. In short, whatever the timing and extent of
slavery in each English colony, at every step English
colonial law seemed to take slavery more or less for
granted.
77
However, ultimately, we simply were not distinct enough:
The Louisiana code noir of Colonial times and the Black
Codes of the eighteen sixties; the pre-Civil War denial of
the vote to Negroes, even to wealthy and educated free men
of color; the ebb and flow of Negro rights in the
Constitutions of 1864 and 1868; the 1879 transfer of
political power from police juries and the legislature to the
Governor; the close election of 1892 and the 1896 victory
for white supremacy; the grandfather clause and the
complicated registration application form in the
Constitution of 1898; the invalidity of the grandfather
clause and the consequent resort to Mississippi's
understanding and interpretation clause; the effectiveness
of the white primary as a means of disfranchising Negroes;
the invalidity of the white primary and the consequent need
to revive enforcement of the interpretation test; the White
League and the Citizens' Councils; the Black League and
the N.A.A.C.P.; the Battle of Liberty Place in 1874 and the
Ouachita voting purge of 1956--4hese are all related
members of a series, all reactions to the same dynamics that
produced the interpretation test and speak eloquently of its
purpose.
78
As one commentator of Judge Wisdom noted:
[I]t was necessary to view the interpretation test as part of
"the State's historic policy and the dominant white citizens'
firm determination to maintain white supremacy in state
and local government by denying to Negroes the right to
vote[;]" it was necessary to begin at the beginning. In the
beginning, as Judge Wisdom aptly noted, "there was, of
77. Jonathan A. Bush, Free to Enslave: The Foundations of Colonial Slave
Law, 5 YALE J. L. & HuMAN. 417,422 (1993).
78. United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353, 380 (E.D. La. 1963).
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course, no problem." There was "no problem" because
"the Codes Noir, from the 1724 Code to Act 33 of the
Territorial Legislature of 1806, disfranchised Negroes."
Surveying the constitutional developments embodied in the
Louisiana Constitutions of 1812, 1845, and 1852, Judge
Wisdom noted, with obvious pride in the history of his
state, that the latter two were "progressive and broadly
democratic documents." The Constitution of 1845 "did
away with the tax-paying qualification for voters and
established universal suffrage for free white males,
regardless of wealth and literacy." The Constitution of
1852 "introduced registration of voters, a progressive step
many years in advance of most states." Despite the
presence in Louisiana of many free blacks, however, the
franchise continued to be limited to white males:
Thus, from the Code Noir of 1724 until 1864, the organic
law of the state ordained that only free white males could
vote or hold office. This was in a state where there were
thousands of free men of color. Many of these were well
educated and owned slaves. Except for suffrage, they
possessed the civil and legal rights of white citizens.79
And then there are the times that our distinctiveness and its
purposes became brutally honest with one another-when our
nomos became the source of our disappointment. Gayarr6 reflects
on the nature of the Code Noir in the sparsely inhabited territory of
early colonial Louisiana:
This law is hard, but it is both wise and necessary in a land
of fifteen slaves to one white. Between the races we cannot
dig too deep a gulf. Upon the Negro, we cannot impress
too much respect for those he serves. This distinction
rigorously upheld even after enfranchisement, is the surest
way to maintain subordination; for the slave must thus see
that his color is ordained to servanthood, and that nothing
can make him his master's equal.8 °
79. Barry Sullivan, In Tribute to John Minor Wisdom: The Honest Muse:
Judge Wisdom and the Uses of History, 60 TUL. L. REv. 314, 329 (1985).
80. Gayarr6, supra note 52, at 215.
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Third and finally, the debate of sources demonstrates the
importance of identity in Louisiana. We are not just civilian. We
are French civilian even when the sources of laws indicate
otherwise.
B. Narrative 2--Revision of Security Rights
In 1990, Louisiana joined the other forty-nine states by
adopting the Article 9 Secured Transactions provisions into its
commercial law (Louisiana has since referred to the provisions as
"Chapter 9" instead of Article 9 to "avoid confusion with the
articles of the Louisiana Civil Code"). 81 This section, like the
previous, is not a normative dialogue of the virtues of Article 9 or
their counterweights. Instead, it is a narrative, like the first, that
exposes the norms of civilian culture in Louisiana law.
In 1967, the Louisiana State Law Institute first considered what
an adoption of Article 9 into the Louisiana civil law would look
like. The report started like this:
In considering changes in Louisiana law the question
constantly arises whether the change is consistent with the
civil law. Yet there is little agreement as to what the term
"civil law" means. Civil law was once defined written law,
but this definition is not helpful today because the common
law probably contains more written words than the civil
law. The volumes of reports and statutes that any common-
law lawyer must use indicate that it too is written law. The
essence of civil law then may be not that it is written but
that it is written in codes, that is, that large areas of the law
are regulated, at least in their broad outlines, by systematic
statutes rather than by judicial opinions or fragmentary
statutes. This in turn leads to a methodology or way of
handling law which emphasizes the creativity of the
legislatures and the interpretive or interstices-filling
function of courts.
In accord with this analysis, it is tempting to say that the
Uniform Commercial Code is a civilian document and the
81. See Henry Deeb Gabriel, Louisiana Chapter Nine (Part One): Creating
and Perfecting the Security Interest, 35 LoY. L. REv. 311, 312 (1989).
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lack of system in the present Louisiana law of secured
transactions involving movables is uncivilian. Louisiana
may keep its uniqueness by being the only common-law
state in the area of commercial transactions. However,
another element should be introduced, namely that by civil
law is often meant a system, the substance or at least the
categories of which are descendents of Roman law.
German law before the code of 1900, Roman law itself, and
present South African law would be classified as civil-law
systems though not meeting modem standards of
codification. But even in the area of legal categories and
substance it is often hard to say that one idea is civilian and
another is not. The difference in substance between Roman
law and French law today probably exceeds the difference
between French and English law. There are also substantial
differences between modem German law and modem
French law. Further common law itself is permeated with
civilian concepts that have either been arrived at
independently or have been imported from continental law
through the courts of equity and canon law. Thus to ask
whether a legal reform is consistent with civil law is at best
a vague question.
82
The report went on to describe the civilian roots of the then-
current Louisiana security devices, 83 to hypothesize what an
Article 9 transition might look like,84 and to recommend its
82. Harry R. Sachse, Report to the Louisiana Law Institute on Article Nine
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 TUL. L. REv. 505, 506 (1967).
83. Id. at 506-07 (discussing Roman and French Law security devices in
terms of the chattel mortgage); id. at 508-10 (discussing privileges and
Louisiana codification); id. at 511-12 (describing Louisiana secured transaction
patterns).
84. Id. at 514-18 (describing the U.C.C. provisions---mortgage, chattel
mortgage, pledge, conditional sale, bulk mortgage, and liens); id. at 527 ("A one
sentence description of the coverage of article 9 in Louisiana terminology would
be the following: article 9 provides the basic rules for the creation, ranking, and
enforcement of all conventional security devices in movables and regulates the
sale of certain incorporeal movables such as accounts receivable. It does not
purport to regulate non-contractual security rights, except as to ranking with
conventional devices, or security rights in immovable property, except as to
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adoption, the reasons being the structure of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the fact that the devices do not differ greatly from traditional
Louisiana law, and the commercial benefit of uniformity. 85 In other
words, the Law Institute attempted to cast Article 9 as a civilian text,
or at least one that could be civilian with the right surroundings.
86
Ultimately, Article 9 was rejected for more than twenty years as
"incompatible with the Louisiana Civil Code.' 87 Then, in 1988, on
the urging of Louisiana's commercial community, the governor
proposed the adoption of Article 9 and appointed William Hawkland
to chair a committee for the preparation of appropriate legislation.
88
Hawkland's committee found that four reasons justified adopting
Article 9 into Louisiana law: (1) the need for uniformity; (2) the need
to reduce transaction costs relating to obtaining security; (3) the
benefit of an expansion of property types that would be classified as
security; and (4) the benefit of greater certainty between state and
federal regulation. 89 Indeed, Hawkland has received much praise for
"finally bringing to [Louisiana] Article 9 of the UCC."90
borderline cases. Another way to put it is that article 9 is an all-inclusive chattel
mortgage, pledge and assignment of accounts receivable statute.").
85. Id. at 554 ("In other words, from a practical standpoint, the ten part
division of personal property under the UCC is not far different from the
fragmentation of movable property under the Louisiana Civil Code and statutes.
The terms represent concepts that people dealing in property will designate in
one way or another.").
86. Id. at 521. Consider the strong emphasis on the Uniform Commercial
Code as a "code" in the civilian sense. Id. "[The UCC] seems to be an
embodiment of the civil law principle of the code as a source of law rather than
the traditional common-law method in which a statute is considered an
abrogation of an already existing law." Id. at 523.
87. COMMERCIAL PAPER AND BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS IN
LOUISIANA: THE COMMERCIAL LAWS iii (Herzberger ed., 1974). See also David
S. Willenzik, Hawkland's Handbook on Chapter 9 Louisiana Commercial Laws,
51 LA. L. REv. 1143, 1143 (1991) ("[T]he first time Louisiana seriously
considered adopting Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code was in 1967-68
when the Louisiana Law Institute summarily rejected the UCC in its entirety as
being contrary to Louisiana Civil Law tradition.").
88. Gabriel, supra note 81, at 312.
89. Id.
90. See Willenzik, supra note 87, at 1143. Ironically, in the same year that
Louisiana finally adopted U.C.C. Article 9, a comprehensive revision of Article
9 commenced in the American Law Institute and the National Conference of
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Just as the civil law served as an analogue to justify Article 9's
adoption by the Law Institute in 1967 (despite rejecting the whole),
the civil law would retain an influence over the version that
Hawkland would introduce. For example, several provisions were
changed from the "Uniform" Commercial Code version that either
reflected civilian traditions or that did not offend the Civil Code
provisions already in place. Notably, the types of collateral were
expanded while use of fixtures as collateral was significantly
restricted. 9' These restrictions reflect a long-held tradition in
Louisiana law that a security interest cannot be attached to something
that is already a fixture. The change was necessary to honor not only
notions of chattel mortgages present in the state, but also the very
distinction between movable and immovable property that undergird
the civil law property system in Louisiana. The alteration thus
honored tradition while adopting a provision that mostly brings
Louisiana into conformity with its sister states.
The civilian story transcended the adoption of U.C.C. Article 9.
First, the Law Institute's initial report cast Article 9 not as a common
law vestige, but rather as a provision that could be seen in civil law
terms. The fact that it was contained in a code and contained a
systematic approach certainly aided that distinction. The ease of
transition from traditional civilian tenets (with French and Roman
roots) was also a strong factor. When Hawkland proposed his
Article 9, the legislature accepted its provisions because it was not
offensive to certain tenets of the civil law tradition.
This is the essential narrative that could be told. It embraces the
civilian approach to law. However, there is also a counter narrative.
For example, consider one commentator who, reviewing the
Louisiana adoption of Article 9, concedes the improvement but also
notes that a part of the civilian character is lost:
Louisiana has adopted article 9 of the U.C.C. That article is
among the best-known pieces of private law legislation in the
world, and needs no discussion here. I will confine myself to
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See James A. Stuckey, Louisiana's
Non-Uniform Variations in UCC Chapter 9, 62 LA. L. REv. 793,795 (2002).
91. Stuckey, supra note 90, at 796.
92. Id. at 830.
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three observations. One is that it does not extend to
immovables. The second is that it honours the publicity
principle, in the sense that nonpossessory security rights
cannot in general be "perfected" without registration (filing).
To that extent it is superior, I would suggest, to the current
Scots and South African law. The third observation concerns
the attachment/perfection contrast which is embedded in
article 9. Is a "perfected security interest" a "real right?"
Presumably it is. Is an "attached," but "unperfected" security
interest a real right? That is more difficult. Either answer is
a problem, for if it is a real right, how does it differ from a
perfected security interest, and if it is not a real right, how
does it differ from a personal right? The whole point of a
security right lies in its third party effect. Its effect "as
between the parties" is really no effect, for all the debtor's
assets are in any case available to the creditor. As the
Louisiana Civil Code provides "[w]hoever has bound himself
personally, is obliged to fulfill his engagements out of all his
property, movable and immovable, present and future." The
U.C.C.'s idea that there is something called "attachment"
whereby a security interest takes effect as between the
parties, as distinct from "perfection," which involves third-
party effect, seems dubious from a civilian standpoint. An
outsider may wonder whether Louisiana considered this issue
before it decided to adopt article 9 of the U.C.C. No doubt
the pressures on Louisiana to adopt the U.C.C. were
comparable with the pressures on Scotland to adopt the
floating charge.
93
The vision of the civil law's interaction with the proposed Article
9 is mediated, in this commentator's view, by a failure to deal
consistently with terms of attachment and perfection in the Civil
Code's notion of a property system. The narrative is thus construed
as a tale that creates more of a problem than a solution.
93. George L. Gretton, Reception Without Integration? Floating Charges
and Mixed Systems, 78 TUL. L. REv. 307,331-32 (2003).
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Shael Herman narrates the story in a more positive tone:
To promote harmony with its sister states, Louisiana has
sometimes adopted, and then adapted, legislation from
mainstream American law . . . [E]ven when Louisiana
lawmakers have consciously preferred national uniformity
over the state's historical traditions, they have reached
compromises between the two. Embedded in the working
habits of lawyers and Courts, the Civil Code has assured that
the mainstream American law at issue would bear a Civilian
stamp. In the regulation of movable security, the Civil Code
has remained a repository of solutions not expressly
articulated in Article 9 of the U.C.C. As a gapfiller and a
source of analogies for unanticipated cases, the Civil Code
fulfills for Louisiana lawyers a role played by the general
common law jurisprudence in the other states.94
This vision of the civil law in Louisiana then, according to
Herman, is the preservation of a Civil Code that both "mediates the
common law influence" as well as translates the common law rubric
into a civilian language. Thus, Herman notes:
Following the nomenclature of the civil code, for example,
Louisiana's initial version of U.C.C. article 9 defined real
estate as "immovable property and real rights therein,"
personal property as "movable property," tangibles as
"corporeal" property, and intangibles as "incorporeal
property." Particularly important for the reformers' case in
favor of Article 9, its enactment did not require short-
circuiting or abandoning the Civil Code, even for security
devices regulated by the article. For example, the term
possession in section 9-109 incorporated the phrase "civil
possession" as defined in Civil Code articles 3421 and
3431.9'
94. Shael Herman, E Pluribus Unum: The Paradox That Safeguards
Louisiana's Mixed Legal System, 78 TUL. L. REv. 457,461 (2003).
95. Id. at 466.
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Article 9 was compatible with the civilian system, not just
because it did not offend the Code, but because in key places it
incorporated the Code.
Both narratives demonstrate that being civilian means to a
certain extent looking civilian, sounding civilian, and acting civilian.
The slavery narrative demonstrates the pervasive respect and
admiration we have for a code. The Article 9 narrative, in turn,
demonstrates how the respect influences and defines the ways we
approach legal innovation.
III. WHY A NoMos
Inhabiting a nomos is not an option. Recognizing our nomos, its
effects on the way we think about legal problems, and the
consequences that come from such recognitions is a different story.
My concern with creating new "legal families" is that this tends to
ignore the valuable lessons we learn from self-recognition.
Principally, the debate of French versus Spanish influence on the
laws of Louisiana is not possible without a nomos. Next, our court
would be constrained against being unique amongst its judicial
fellows. Finally, our Code would be just another lengthy statute,
with very little normative material, but only policy decisions by
elected officials.
Instead, a nomos empowers a community to understand what it
is, what it is becoming, and what it imagines it can be. As Robert
Cover elegantly stated:
The great legal civilizations have, therefore, been marked by
more than technical virtuosity in their treatment of practical
affairs, by more than elegance or rhetorical power in the
composition of their texts, by more, even, than genius in the
invention of new forms for new problems. A great legal
civilization is marked by the richness of the nomos in which
it is located and which it helps to constitute. The varied and
complex materials of that nomos establish paradigms for
dedication, acquiescence, contradiction, and resistance.
These materials present not only bodies of rules or doctrine
486 [Vol. 67
NOMOS OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
to be understood, but also worlds to be inhabited. To inhabit
a nomos is to know how to live in it.
96
And so I return to the analogy I offered at the beginning of this
comment and ask: Are we civilians standing on the walls, guarding
our institutions from the encroaching barbarians? I say that if we
inhabit a nomos, we need not worry about their vulgar institutions
adulterating our legal system. Our nomos defines itself so that the
innovation brought by the "commoners" need not threaten our own
institutional perception.
Likewise we need not sit in the coliseum either, waiting to see
which gladiator will win our praise. I say that if we inhabit a
nomos, the contests that we view as being so imperative towards
defining who we are actually do not define us at all. Our nomos
defines us. La Fin!
96. Cover, supra note 22, at 6.
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